Sustainable blockchain-enabled services: Smart contracts by Wright, Craig & Serguieva, Antoaneta
1 
 
Sustainable blockchain-enabled services: Smart contracts 
Craig Wright 
nChain , London , UK  
craig@ncrypt.com 
Antoaneta Serguieva 
nChain , London , UK 
antoaneta@ncrypt.com 
 
 
Abstract—This chapter contributes to evolving the versatility 
and complexity of blockchain-enabled services through 
extending the functionality of blockchain-enforced smart 
contracts. The contributions include: (i) a method for automated 
management of contracts with hierarchical conditionality 
structures through an hierarchy of intelligent agents and the use 
of hierarchical cryptographic key-pairs; (ii) a method for 
efficient and secure matching and transfer of smart- 
contract underlyings (entities) among disparate smart 
contracts/subcontracts; (iii) a method for producing an 
hierarchy of common secrets to facilitate hierarchical 
communication channels of increased security in the context of 
smart contracts/subcontracts/underlyings; and (iv) a method  
for building secure and optimized repositories through 
distributed hash tables in the context of contracts/ 
subcontracts/underlyings. These methods help providing 
services that allow both narrower and worldwide reach and 
distribution of resources. The longevity of the blockchain 
technology is achieved through continuous innovation. 
Blockchain-enabled services are potentially an efficient, secure, 
automated, and cost-effective alternative or complement to 
current service infrastructures in a range of domains (legal, 
medical, financial, government, IoT). 
Keywords—hierarchical smart-contract conditionality, 
hierarchical cryptographic/encription keys, transferring smart-
contract underlyings, sustainable blockchain-enabled services.  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The acceleration of blockchain functionality aims at 
enabling complex services in a secure, efficient, and creatively 
automated manner. For a range of domains, blockchain-
enabled services can provide viable alternatives or 
complements to existing service infrastructures, particularly 
to those currently underperforming or of unreliable security. 
The emerging research area of smart contracts plays a critical 
role in building the alternative and complementary 
infrastructures. The methods proposed in this paper are 
associated with smart contracts, and include innovative 
elements that have not been considered in the literature.  
We can relate the proposed methods to existing open 
questions, as reviewed next: 
▫ Challenges in validating and verifying smart contracts (SM) 
are recognized in [1], considering that SM may encode legal 
contracts written in natural language. The current paper 
addresses these challenges in Section II, and proposes a 
contract codification model along with a method for 
automated SM management, validation, and verification, 
enforced through the blockchain.  
▫ The combination of the Internet-of-things (IoT) and 
blockchain is discussed in [2], and it is recognized that this 
combination can facilitate the sharing of services and 
resources through a marketplace of services among IoT 
devices. Therefore, corresponding solutions should be 
developed. The codification model introduced in the current 
paper translates a wide range of contracts. The concept of 
‘contract’ is used in its broader meaning of structured 
control conditions. The method for automated management 
of such conditions, proposed in Section II next, is directly 
applicable and beneficial to emerging IoT services. The 
method proposed in Section III, for efficient and secure 
transfer of entities underlying smart contracts, also 
contributes to creating a marketplace of services between 
IoT devices. We support the view that the blockchain-IoT 
combination is powerful and can cause significant 
transformations across several industries.  
▫ The potential of blockchain technology for innovating and 
transforming governmental processes is questioned in [3]. 
The conclusion there is that governmental processes would 
benefit most from the technology if blockchain applications 
are customized to fit process requirements. The secure 
repository of smart-contract templates, i.e. smart-process 
templates, which we propose in Section II here, contributes 
to implementing that conclusion. The repository mechanism 
involves each institution accessing the smart-templates 
repository to derive its institutional semi-templates and 
continuously amend them through reuse.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: 
Section II considers the automated management of 
blockchain-enforced smart contracts, Section III is focused on 
smart contracts’ efficiency and security, and Section IV states 
the conclusions and indicates further research focus.  
II. AUTOMATED MANAGEMENT OF BLOCKCHAIN-
ENFORCED SMART CONTRACTS 
A. Benefits 
Smart contracts potentially extend the range of services 
facilitated through the blockchain technology, transform 
existing legal and financial infrastructures, and provide for 
emerging IoT services. Institutions, individuals, intelligent 
computing agents, or IoT devices play the role of 
counterparties in a smart contract. The method proposed here 
simplifies the management of such contracts, based on 
adapting, combining and implementing key components from 
[4][5][6][7]. The proposed innovation: 
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 allows contracts to be time-bound, condition-bound, open-
ended, and rolling-over; 
 introduces a security-enhanced control mechanism that 
permits or prohibits access to an off-chain contract 
repository in an intelligent manner; 
 provides a formalism for translating any structured control 
conditions into a corresponding 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  and its 
deterministic finite automation 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷; 
 provides an intelligent-agent mechanism to follow and 
execute the embedded 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 logic; 
 allows for holding a secure public record of agents’ code on 
the blockchain; 
 introduces a mechanism for turning an unspent crypto-
transaction 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈  into an indication of the stage in 
executing the hierarchy of subcontracts (that allows control 
over different aspects of the overall contract to be 
partitioned) within a smart-contract structure; 
 introduces a mechanism to hold a secure public record of 
current and past contracts on the blockchain, in a manner 
that allows automated determination of their validity and 
release of their details to authorized entities upon validation. 
The initiation, stages of execution, and closure of a smart 
contract are recorded on the blockchain through the creation, 
broadcasting and recording of crypto-transactions. This 
allows verifying the current or past existence of a contract by 
looking up corresponding blockchain transactions. The stage 
of execution of an existing contract can also be verified, by 
looking up recorded transactions corresponding to the 
initiation or closure of its subcontracts. The logic of the 
structured control conditions from the 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  is 
embedded within the locking/unlocking scripts of blockchain 
transactions, as well as within other transaction elements such 
as the nLockTime field. The contract’s logic is enforced 
through individual actions and overall behavior of one or 
several intelligent-agent applications. For accountability and 
for reuse, parts of the codified overall behavior of an 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, 
or links to off-chain repositories where the code is stored, are 
also embedded within the locking/unlocking scripts of 
transactions recorded on the blockchain. The access to these 
repositories, as well as to repositories storing the contract 
documents and the 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , is selective, partial, 
and secure. The access to the code or parts of it, and the access 
to the contract or its subcontracts, matches the requirements 
and character of the contract and the preferences of the 
multiple counterparties involved. 
B. Contract Model and Tokenisation  
A repository of contracts can be implemented as a 
distributed hash table (DHT) [8] across storage resources 
within the network supporting a blockchain. A reference or 
link hash to a contract’s entry in the repository is stored as 
metadata within a blockchain transaction, and serves as a 
DHT look-up key for referencing the contract from the 
blockchain. The use of a master encryption key and multiple 
sub-keys by each counterparty, as proposed in Section III.A 
next, allows for secure repository access of a counterparty to 
the contract or the subcontracts that this counterparty is 
authorized for. Auditing authorities are also provided with 
access corresponding to the scope of each audit. Consider the 
following example: 
▫ A building company in England enters into a contract with 
multiple counterparties to deliver a new development. The 
contract has multiple subcontracts, and one of them 
addresses the issuance of a plans certificate, as required by 
the relevant regulation. One of the counterparties on this 
subcontract is the Building Control Department of a Local 
Authority. The Control Department has access to this and 
probably further subcontracts in the repository, but may not 
have access to subcontracts specifying remunerations for the 
pool of builders or other confidential details. Another 
subcontract of the building contract concerns the issuance of 
a final certificate, as required by regulation. A counterparty 
on this subcontract is an approved building inspector, and 
his secure access is defined by analogy with the former case. 
The building company and its auditors may have access to 
all of the subcontracts in the repository, and to all blockchain 
transactions enforcing the contract and its subcontracts. The 
auditing firm may not be a counterparty to any subcontract, 
and may access the repository after the completion of the 
contract. The auditors still are able to retrieve the relevant 
information and verify transactions throughout the past 
execution of the contract, and thus assess the performance 
of the building company.  
The use of multiple encryption sub-keys also allows that 
trusted third parties may modify some of the conditionality 
and subcontracts of a stored contract. This translates into an 
amended behavior of the intelligent 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚  enforcing the 
contract. The blockchain transactions, which the 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 
create for the amended instantiation of the contract, include 
amended parameters in comparison with the transactions they 
created for a previous instantiation. For example, the renewal 
of a lease contract or the renewal of a rental contract may 
involve amended amounts and rates. Multiple encryption sub-
keys (see Section III.A) further facilitate establishing a 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 [5] for each pair of counterparties on each 
subcontract. A 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 based encryption allows for 
a secure channel of communication between a pair of 
counterparties, when it is necessary to negotiate values of 
parameters related to a subcontract such as lease rates and 
rental amounts. Differing 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚  between the 
same counterparties on different subcontracts provide for 
additional security. 
Having considered, as prerequisite, the mechanism of a 
DHT repository for smart contracts, we now continue with the 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚. The list of its elements includes: 
 a codification scheme that allows a complete description of 
any type of contract (structured control conditions), and is 
based on constructs such as XBRL, XML, JSON, etc.; 
 a deterministic finite automaton 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷  ‘translating’ the 
contract logic and conditionality, where the 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷  can be 
fully defined within the codification scheme and consists of: 
▫ a set of parameters and indication where to source them; 
▫ a set of state definitions; 
▫ a set of transitions between the states, including the 
trigger for a transition and the rules followed during 
transition; 
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▫ rules definition table; 
 definitions of the specific parameters for this instance of the 
contract; 
 a 'compiler' converting the codification scheme into 
intelligent-agent code and crypto-transaction script. 
The 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 is the essential component of the 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 
and is implemented as an agent-based process. For complex 
contracts, the 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷  implementation involves a sequence of 
processes or parallel sequences of processes. Processes access 
off-chain resources, and/or monitor the values of off-chain 
and on-chain parameters, and/or create different blockchain 
transactions, under each conditionality step within the active 
contract and under different triggers and parameter values. 
Agent-based processes also send multisig transactions for 
signature by counterparties prior to broadcasting them, and/or 
communicate off-chain to inform counterparties or trusted 
third parties, and/or verify on-chain records related to the 
execution of past contracts. A 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 can manage a 
hierarchy of 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚  that carry out tasks 
defined in a smart contract. The 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  controls, 
directs, monitors, and authorizes the activities of  
each 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 , and also coordinates their 
activities. The 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  and 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 
communicate to execute the variety of tasks. 
Having introduced the 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚, the first step in 
its implementation is to indicate the existence of a contract. 
The 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  on this contract creates the first 
transaction 𝑈𝑈 associated with the contract, broadcasts it to the 
blockchain network, monitors when it is recorded on the 
blockchain and extracts its ID. Thus, the existence of the 
contract and the time when it became active are a permanent 
auditable record publicly available on the blockhcain, 
although the details of the contract may not be publicly 
available. The 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  uses a pay-to-script-hash 
𝑃𝑃2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  address when creating transaction 𝑈𝑈 . For such 
transaction to be spent, a recipient must provide a script 
matching the 𝑃𝑃2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 script hash as well as data that makes the 
script evaluate to true. 𝑃𝑃2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  is created using the contract 
metadata. After 𝑈𝑈, a number of further transactions follow that 
are associated with the contract and its subcontracts. They are 
created by the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 or by 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚. 
A range of these transactions involve tokenization. In the 
rest of this Section II.B, we introduce and extend tokenization 
mechanisms from [9][10]. Each 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  or 
𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 has its own master key and sub-keys. 
The hierarchies of keys are used in combination with the 
tokenization mechanism and allow for contract structure of 
any complexity to be created and implemented, and for the 
related subcontracts and schedules to be confirmed, triggered, 
executed, and terminated. In this context, a token can non-
exhaustively be used to represent and detail, in the form of a 
crypto-transaction, the transferable rights conferred by a 
specific contract or subcontract. The 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐  efficiently uses 
metadata comprising only three parameters:  
 a number of units available overall, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚; 
 a quantity of 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚  to be transferred from a 
sender to at least one recipient; 
 a 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚  for calculating a value for the 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 pegged to the crypto- currency. 
Such 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 can represent any type of transferable rights, and 
thus common algorithms are reused as parts of the codified 
behavior of different 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚. The 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 is either divisible or 
non-divisible, corresponding to the transfer of divisible or 
non-divisible rights. In the latter case, the value of the 
parameter 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 is set to 0. For divisible rights, the 
tokenized value transferred in the transaction output is tied to 
the underlying crypto-currency amount via a non-zero 
𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 , and the transferred rights are specified in 
terms of a 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚. An example of divisible tokens are 
those transferring quantities of bearer shares, where a share is 
a percentage ownership (a pegging rate) of the company. An 
example of non-divisible tokens are those transferring bearer 
bonds, where a bond is redeemable for an exact amount of a 
fiat currency such as USD or GBP. If some smart contracts or 
their subcontracts involve issuing and selling bearer shares or 
bonds, then among the crypto-transactions being created 
during the implementation of the contracts are also transaction 
representing the transfer of tokenized quantities of shares or 
bonds.  
Furthermore, the number of units available overall in  
the tokenized rights is either limited or unlimited. In the 
former case, the parameter 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 is fixed and always 
greater than 0 . An example of limited units is the shared  
ownership of a race horse, such as 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 = 10  
and 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 = 10% , or 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 = 25  and 
𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 = 4%. An example of unlimited overall units 
is the inventory of a product in a warehouse, as the inventory 
can be increased at any time and allow an increase in the 
tokenized amount of product units. Bearer shares are also an 
example of potentially unlimited units, due to the company 
being able to issue more shares. In some cases of unlimited 
units, the current total number of units does not matter for the 
transfer of ownership, and the value of parameter 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 
in the token is set to 0. Such is the inventory example, where 
one unit is one instance of the transferable product – a T-shirt 
in the warehouse stock of T-shirts. In other cases, the current 
number of potentially unlimited total available units matters. 
As this number is variable, a 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 monitors 
it and identifies its correct value for each instantiation of such 
divisible token. In case of bearer shares, transferring tokenized 
ownership rights involves parameter values as follows: 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 = current number of issued  
and non-redeemed shares 
𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 = 1
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢 %  
A 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 monitors the number of issued shares 
and the number of redeemed shares, and identifies the current 
value of 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚.  
A final point here is that the crypto-currency amount, 
which is attached to the output of a 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐  transaction, is 
arbitrary. Such transaction is only a facilitator of ownership 
transfer, and the true value of transferred rights is found 
through the metadata parameters. We introduce a meaningful 
use of a 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 ’s output amount, under the proposed here 
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specification of tokenization. In a divisible token, we link that 
amount to the 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚, when the token is split into 
several transaction outputs. Having considered the contract 
model and a relevant tokenization mechanism in this Section, 
the focus in the next Section II.C is on a contract’s 
conditionality and subcontracts. 
C. Master Contracts’ Conditionality and Subcontracts 
A 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is interpreted here as remaining in 
effect, as long as there is a valid unspent transaction output 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 representing the existence of the contract. That unspent 
state is influenced and altered by the behavior  
of the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  and 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚.  Agents’ 
behavior is controlled through conditions in the  
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  that translate provisions and 
stipulations from the contract document. For example, a 
condition may involve that the contract expires when the 
values of some variables reach specified thresholds. 
Transactions associated with a contract are a permanent, 
unalterable public record of the contract's existence and 
current status. The termination of a contract is also recorded 
on the blockchain, as a spent output in a crypto-transaction. 
Anyone can use a software module to determine, from the 
blockchain, at what stage of its execution a contract is or 
whether it has been terminated.  
In this context, a 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is a contract that is directly 
related to an existing 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, where the metadata 
in transactions associated with the 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  contain a 
hashed pointer or reference to the location of the 
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 within the DHT repository. The existence 
of a 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  is implemented, similarly to a 
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, as an 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 with a deterministic redeem 
script address. The 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  is interpreted as being 
completed when this 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈  is spent. The steps used for 
creating the deterministic addresses in the 𝑃𝑃2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 transactions 
associated with 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚, within a 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐′s 
conditionality structure, include the following:  
 derive a new public sub-key using seed information; 
 if an entry for a 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  does not exist in the 
repository of contracts, then create an entry so that: 
▫ the entry is a description of this 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 compliant 
with the codification scheme of the 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 
introduced in Section II.B; 
▫ this description includes a reference to the 
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 entry in the repository;  
 once the 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  entry is created or if such entry 
already exists in the repository, then add the reference to this 
entry to the metadata of crypto-transactions associated with 
the 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐; 
▫ these metadata may also include a reference to the 
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 entry; 
 use the amended metadata to create 𝑃𝑃2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 addresses.  
A use-case for creating subcontracts is described in  
Table 1. The mechanism described at step six in Table 1 is also 
used to monitor further types of conditions within a given 
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐. For example, if a contract is worth a Z 
amount of crypto-currency with 𝑍𝑍1,⋯ ,𝑍𝑍𝑘𝑘  to be paid at 
checkpoints 1  through 𝑡𝑡 , then this is implemented as a  
 
TABLE I.  ISSUING A SUBCONTRACT BASED ON AN EXISTING CONTRACT 
Step Details 
one 
The 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 derives, using a seed value, a new public sub-key 
from its master public key used to create the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐. The 
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 derives, using the same seed, a new public 
sub-key from his master public key used for the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐. 
The 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 can be an institution or an individual 
responsible off-chain for the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐. The seed value is 
based on information about the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 . Examples of 
appropriate seeds include:  
-Transaction ID of the 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 published on the blockchain to indi-
cate the existence of the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐; 
-Redeem script hash securing the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 and created by 
the 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐  or the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  in an 𝑚𝑚 -of-𝑐𝑐  multi-
signature structure, where at least the public keys of the 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 and the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 must be supplied to this 
script. Depending on the terms of the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 , other 
signatures may also be required, including the signatures of a 
𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  and a 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 , where the 
𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 has responsibilities for the 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 in 
the off-chain world. The number 𝑐𝑐 further includes the number of 
metadata blocks. 
*Note: If a 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠_𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is being created instead of a 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐-  
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, then this step 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 may include a 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 deri-
ving a new public sub-key, though a seed value, from its master public 
key used to sign the parent 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐. All the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, the 
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐, the  𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 , and the 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠-  
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 use the same seed to derive a sub-sub-key or a sub-
key, within each one’s hierarchy of public keys, from the 
corresponding parent key. A parent key for the different signatories in 
this case may be either their master key or their sub-key.  
two 
Depending on the nature of the 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 being created, the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚- 
𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 either: 
-uses the location of the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 entry in the repository of 
contracts; or 
-embeds a link to the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 entry within the 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐- 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 entry of the repository, and stores the location of the subcon-
tract entry for later use.  
*Note: the contract repository can be public, private or semi-private, 
depending on the nature of 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚. 
three 
The 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  creates a redeem script covering the 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐- 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 being secured, in an 𝑚𝑚-of-𝑐𝑐 multi-signature structure, where 𝑚𝑚 
is the number of compulsory signatures and 𝑐𝑐 further includes the 
number of non-compulsory signatures and the number of metadata 
blocks. The number of metadata blocks includes at least the reference 
to the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  repository entry and the reference to the 
𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 entry. Alternatively, this number may include at least a 
metadata block storing the reference to the 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 entry where 
that entry has embedded in it the reference to the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 
repository entry, as well as further metadata blocks.  
four 
The 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 or the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 pays a nominal 
amount of crypto-currency to the redeem script calculated in step 
three, through a standard pay-to-script-hash 𝑃𝑃2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 transaction. 
five The 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  waits until the 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  transaction has been published onto the blockchain and extracts its ID. 
six 
six A: For a fixed-duration 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 then 
creates a new transaction, with a lock-time set to the expiry time of 
the 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐. This new transaction pays the output from step five 
back to the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 or to the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐. 
six B: For a 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 with no fixed duration, the repay script in 
the new transaction created at step six is not time-locked but imple-
mentted as an 𝑚𝑚 -of- 𝑐𝑐  multi-signature element. This transaction 
requires a sign-off from a 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 monitoring the termi-
nation conditions for the 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, and may be a sign-off from a 
third party. The multi-signature element may state “subject to sign-
off by <x>”. The new transaction is then circulated to the required 
signatories to sign, which include at least <x>. The outputs from such 
transaction include the fees to <x> and the generated 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈. 
5 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  plus  𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 . Each of the 
𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚  is marked as complete using the same or 
different signatories (𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚, notaries, surveyors, brokers). 
Thus, a public record is maintained showing which of the 
conditions attached to the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 have been met 
and which are yet to be met. For 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖{1,⋯ , 𝑡𝑡} , a 
𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢   monitors the state of 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢 
and triggers payment 𝑍𝑍𝑢𝑢 , once the monitoring confirms that 
𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢 is complete.  
Transactions implementing an example scenario of 
contract conditionality are shown in Fig. 1. This scenario 
corresponds to the building contract from Section II.B. The 
contract includes at least two conditions requiring a planning 
approval through the issuance of plans certificate and a 
building-standard approval through the issuance of a final 
certificate, correspondingly. Building companies often enter 
in such multiple-counterparty contracts to deliver new 
buildings. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  of such contracts already exists, and that 
there is an entry in the contract repository that can be  
reused by instantiating it with amended counterparties  
and parameters. The ‘template’ contract can be reused 
simultaneously by several active instantiations, when the 
building company works in parallel on several projects that 
target the delivery of different properties. The simultaneous 
instantiations may also be due to different building companies 
having an active project each, or having more than one active 
project each. When a building company reuses the repository 
entry for the 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 for the first time, it creates 
a new repository entry that acts as the company’s own 
template from then on. That latter template, or rather semi-
template, may embed a link to the repository record of the 
former template. When reusing the semi-template next, the  
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Figure 1.  Creating crypto-transactions corresponding to  
contract and subcontract start, execution and completion. 
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company only appends a line of metadata to the repository 
entry for that semi-template, and do not create a new 
repository entry. The appended metadata plays a key role in 
creating, monitoring and spending crypto-transactions that 
implement the corresponding instantiation of the contract. The 
metadata in such transactions include a reference to the 
company’s 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠_𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, and a pointer to the 
line in it containing the specific metadata for this instantiation 
of the semi-template. 
Within the automated management of a building 
company’s 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠_𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 , a 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 
associated with the semi-template monitors for a new line of 
parameters being appended. New lines are appended by the 
building company. The mechanism involves the company 
routinely allocating some amount of crypto-currency to the 
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, so that the agent can activate at any time the 
first steps in its algorithm on issuing a new instance of the 
contract. The first step in that algorithm is the creation and 
broadcast of the transaction shown in dark shade in Fig. 1, and 
extracting its ID  𝑈𝑈1 after the transaction is recorded on the 
blockchain. Thus, 𝑈𝑈1  becomes a secure, immutable, and 
publically available electronic record of the existence of the 
new contract in the physical world. The amount of crypto-
currency 𝑌𝑌 accessed for this step by the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 can 
be small. The amount allocated by the building company for 
access by the master agent is reviewed at routine intervals. At 
the end of an interval, the balance (excluding a set minimum) 
is automatically returned to the building company, and it is 
assessed if and what amount to make available to the agent in 
the next period. When the activity of a company is more 
versatile and it is captured through several semi-templates of 
different type, then the allocation and reallocation of crypto-
currency amounts to the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 of the templates is 
managed and optimized by a higher-hierarchy agent called 
𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚_𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 . The reallocation is based on the 
evaluation of the prevailing performance and usual needs of 
the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚. That performance and needs are linked 
to the type of business line a semi-template is supporting 
within the company’s business portfolio, and the performance 
of the company along the different business lines.  
Following 𝑈𝑈1 , Fig. 1 presents next (in light grey) 
transactions related to two of the subcontracts that the 
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  of this template manages within an 
instantiation of the 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 . First, 𝑈𝑈2  indicates 
that a 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1  for getting a planning approval exists, 
and next, 𝑈𝑈3 indicates that a 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐2 exists for getting 
a building-standard approval. On the other hand, transaction 
𝑈𝑈4 confirms that a planning approval is received, and pays the 
fees to the local authority’s building control department. 
Therefore, the first 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1  is now closed. The 
complete conditionality structure of a building contract is 
more complex, involves a larger number of 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚, 
and in some cases also involves 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠_𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚  and 
𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚. The hierarchical structure emerges in 
Fig. 1, and shows that the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  derives a secret 
(private) sub-key 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1  for managing 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1  and a 
secret sub-key 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆2 for managing 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐2. Section III 
next discuses hierarchical structures in more detail. 
III. SMART CONTRACTS’ EFFICIENCY AND SECURITY 
A. Hierarchical Structures of Contracts, Crypto-keys, 
and Common Secrets abeted 
The automated management of smart contracts [4] 
introduced in Sections II contributes to scaling blockchain 
functionality. Section II.C indicates that managing contract 
conditionality is assisted by a hierarchical structure of 
public/private key-pairs. The derivation of crypto-key 
hierarchies [5][11] supports the execution and management of 
smart contract. Let us consider a complex contract’s 
conditionality implemented through a hierarchy of 
𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 and 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠_𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚, and assisted through 
an hierarchy of sub-keys and sub-sub-keys. Fig. 2 shows a tree 
structure in blue representing the hierarchical contract 
conditionality, and a corresponding three structure in red 
representing hierarchical keys needed to assist the 
implementation of the complex contract. Each element in the 
red tree corresponds to a public/private key-pair, created by 
adding multi-rehashed relevant information. That information 
may include IDs of existing transactions or metadata from 
existing entries in the contract repository. Though only the 
secret (private) keys 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  are indicated in the red tree, a 
corresponding public key 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 is also derived for every derived 
secret key. Therefore, the tree corresponds to a hierarchy of 
asymmetric public/private key-pairs 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆/𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 . For clarity of 
introducing the mechanism, it is assumed that the 
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷  manages all 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚  and 
𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠_𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚. In practice, some of these elements of the 
blue structure can be managed by 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚.  
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Notice that each element of the blue structure is 
implemented by at least two transactions, i.e. indicating that a 
new (sub-sub-)contract exists and then terminating it. This is 
the case with transactions 𝑈𝑈2  and 𝑈𝑈4  in Fig. 1, for example. 
Therefore, the pair in each element of the red structure is used 
to sign and redeem scripts in at least two transactions. Next, 
the notation 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 in Fig. 2 refers to the master private key 
of the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 (𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷), and 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1,1 to 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢,1 are 
private sub-keys of the same agent, where 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1,1 to 
𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢,1  can be executed in parallel. On the  
other hand, 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1,1 and 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1,𝑢𝑢 are the private sub-keys 
of this agent, where 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1,1  to 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1,𝑢𝑢  
can only be executed in sequence. Further, 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1,𝑢𝑢,1,1  
to 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1,𝑢𝑢,𝑘𝑘,1  are 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 ’s private sub-sub-keys, where 
𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠_𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1,𝑢𝑢,1,1  to 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠_𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1,𝑢𝑢,𝑘𝑘,1  can  
be executed in parallel only after 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1,1  
to 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1,𝑢𝑢  are executed in sequence. Finally, 
𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,1  to 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑝𝑝  are 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷’s private sub-sub-keys, 
where 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠_𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗,1,1  to 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠_𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑝𝑝 
can only be executed in sequence and only after  
𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢,1 to 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗 are executed in sequence. 
Notice that some 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚  can serve as 
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚  for the 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠_𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚  that follow 
below them in the hierarchical structure. Thus, 
𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1,𝑢𝑢  can act as a 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  or rather  
as a 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  for 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠_𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1,𝑢𝑢,1,1  to 
𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠_𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1,𝑢𝑢,𝑘𝑘,1 as well as for 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠_𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1,𝑢𝑢,𝑘𝑘,1 
to 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠_𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1,𝑢𝑢,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚 . 
In the general case, any information can serve the role of 
a seed. However, the information may also be meaningful in 
the contexts that the hierarchy of keys is used. We choose here 
as 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  𝑀𝑀 , the redeem script hash securing the 
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 and created in an 𝑚𝑚-of-𝑐𝑐 multi-signature 
structure. Further, a 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠_𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐  seed 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀  is chosen as the 
redeem script hash securing a 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠_𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  and 
created in an 𝑚𝑚-of-𝑐𝑐 multi-signature structure. From Fig. 2, it 
can be deducted that at least sub-master seeds 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀1,𝑢𝑢 and 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗 
must be chosen, corresponding to 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1,𝑢𝑢  
and 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠_𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗 . The seeds 𝑀𝑀 , 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀1,𝑢𝑢 , 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗 
are involved in producing the generator values from 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺1,1 to 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑝𝑝 , when deriving the tree of asymmetric cryptographic 
key-pairs. Key derivation starts with the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 
selecting a random value for the base point 𝐵𝐵 , and 
communicating it to the 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐. The base point is 
applied, as described below, to derive a public key from a 
corresponding private key, in order to complete an 
asymmetric cryptographic key-pair using Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC). The base point can also be 
communicated to any other signees on transactions created in 
implementing the hierarchical contract conditionality, 
particularly if they have a significant role in the structure and 
that role involves communications/negotiations in relation to 
a number of elements in the structure. We will introduce the 
mechanism first focusing on the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  and the 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 , and their meaningful hierarchies of 
cryptographic key-pairs and 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 . However, 
this mechanism can be applied accordingly when other 
signees also derive their hierarchies of key-pairs and 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚. The mechanism can further be adapted to 
the case when some branches of the conditionality structure 
are managed by 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚.  
Considering Fig. 2, the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 starts with its 
ECDSA-valid [12] secret key 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 , where ECDSA 
abbreviates the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm. 
Then, 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 derives its hierarchy of private keys as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,1 = 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟,1
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟,1 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷_256�𝑀𝑀, 𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟,1�   �  for 1 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐   (1) 
𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1,𝑟𝑟 = 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1,𝑟𝑟−1 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷_256𝑟𝑟−1(𝑀𝑀) (2) 
for 2 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑠𝑠 
𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1,𝑢𝑢,𝑟𝑟,1 = 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1,𝑢𝑢 + 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺1,𝑢𝑢,𝑟𝑟,1 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺1,𝑢𝑢,𝑟𝑟,1 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷_256�𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀1,𝑢𝑢 , 𝐿𝐿1,𝑢𝑢,1,1��  for 1 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 (3)  
𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟 = 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟−1 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷_256𝑟𝑟−1�𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗�  (4) 
for 2 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑝𝑝 
where 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷_256𝑟𝑟(𝑀𝑀) = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷_256�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷_256𝑟𝑟−1(𝑀𝑀)�  (5) 
For 1 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 , generator value 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟,1 is produced using the 
concatenation �𝑀𝑀, 𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟,1� of the redeem script hash M of the 
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  and the 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  hash 𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟,1 . 
Here, 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟,1  is an instantiation of the 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠_𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  which is being amended from  
the 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟,1. Further, for 1 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑡𝑡, generator 
values 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺1,𝑢𝑢,𝑟𝑟,1  use the 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀1,𝑢𝑢  instead  
of the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  𝑀𝑀 . Also, 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺1,𝑢𝑢,𝑟𝑟,1  are produced by 
analogy to 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟,1 , as 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠_𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚1,𝑢𝑢,𝑟𝑟,1  for 1 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 
are executed in parallel, similarly to the way 
𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠_𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟,1 for 1 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 are executed in parallel. 
On the other hand, generator values 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺1,𝑟𝑟  are produced by 
rehashing the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  𝑀𝑀  for 2 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑠𝑠 , and values 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟  are produced by rehashing the 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 
𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗  for  2 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑝𝑝 . 
Next, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), properties of 
elliptic curve operations, and the base point 𝐵𝐵  are used to 
complete the asymmetric cryptographic key-pairs and derive 
the public keys of the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐. The operator + in (6-
10) stands for scalar addition and the operator × refers to 
elliptic curve point multiplication. Having that elliptic curve 
cryptography algebra is distributive, the hierarchy of public 
keys of the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is produced as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 = 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐵𝐵  (6) 
𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,1 = 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 + 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟,1 × 𝐵𝐵 ,  for 1 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 (7) 
𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆1,𝑟𝑟 = 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆1,𝑟𝑟−1 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷_256𝑟𝑟−1(𝑀𝑀) × 𝐵𝐵  (8) 
for 2 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑠𝑠  
𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆1,𝑢𝑢,𝑟𝑟,1 = 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆1,𝑢𝑢 + 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺1,𝑢𝑢,𝑟𝑟,1 × 𝐵𝐵  for 1 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 (9) 
𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟 = 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟−1 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷_256𝑟𝑟−1�𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗�  (10) 
for 2 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑝𝑝 
where 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟,1 are the generator values used in (1) and 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺1,𝑢𝑢,𝑟𝑟,1 
are the generator values used in (3). By analogy with the 
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𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐’𝑚𝑚  hierarchy of key-pairs, the public/private 
key pairs of the 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 are derived as follows:  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,1 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟,1  for 1 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐   (11) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1,𝑟𝑟 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1,𝑟𝑟−1 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷_256𝑟𝑟−1(𝑀𝑀) (12) 
for 2 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑠𝑠 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1,𝑢𝑢,𝑟𝑟,1 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1,𝑢𝑢 + 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺1,𝑢𝑢,𝑟𝑟,1  , for 1 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 (13)  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗,1,𝑟𝑟 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗,1,𝑟𝑟−1 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷_256𝑟𝑟−1�𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗�  (14) 
for 2 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑝𝑝 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐵𝐵  (15) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,1 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 + 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟,1 × 𝐵𝐵 ,  for 1 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 (16) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆1,𝑟𝑟 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆1,𝑟𝑟−1 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷_256𝑟𝑟−1(𝑀𝑀) × 𝐵𝐵  (17) 
for 2 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑠𝑠  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆1,𝑢𝑢,𝑟𝑟,1 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆1,𝑢𝑢 + 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺1,𝑢𝑢,𝑟𝑟,1 × 𝐵𝐵  for 1 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 (18) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟−1 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷_256𝑟𝑟−1�𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗�  (19) 
for 2 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑝𝑝 
In scripts and transactions related to different 
𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚  or 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠_𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 , the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 
and the 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐  use different corresponding keys 
within each one’s hierarchy of keys. This increases security, 
as even if a transaction related to a (𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠_)𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 is 
compromised, the integrity of the rest of the smart contract 
structure is preserved. Furthermore, an element in one’s 
hierarchy of public keys can be produced in advance of the 
execution of the corresponding (𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠_)𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, as the 
relevant generator value is available and known to the 
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 and the 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐  before that 
execution. Notice that the generator values can be produced 
in a different way, and (1-19) present just one alternative. 
However, any version should allow the evaluation of the 
current generator value before the current element of the 
conditionality structure. Thus, the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 evaluates 
each of the public keys 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,1  to 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗,1,𝑟𝑟  of the 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐  at the same time at which the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  A hierarchical of common secrets. 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 evaluates them. The vice-verse is also true, 
and the 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐 evaluates each of the public keys 
𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,1 to 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗,1,𝑟𝑟 of the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 at the same 
time at which the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  evaluates them. The 
pairing private keys are produced by their owner also at that 
same time, i.e. the earliest step he can produce the 
corresponding public keys. 
The produced hierarchies of cryptographic keys can also 
be used to produce an hierarchy of encryption keys. Notice 
that the 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐  and the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  produce 
independently the same hierarchy of 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 CS, 
as presented in Fig. 3. The 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐  produces the 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 as: 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,1 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,1 × 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,1  , for 1 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐              
⋮
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟 × 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟  , for 2 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑝𝑝  (20) 
and the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  produces the same 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_ 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 as: 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,1 = 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,1 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,1  , for 1 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑐               
⋮
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟 = 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢,𝑡𝑡,1,𝑟𝑟  , for 2 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑝𝑝  (21) 
Now, each 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐  𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟,1  to 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟  serves as a 
basis for a symmetric encryption key securing a channel  
for communication between 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  and 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷  regarding a 
corresponding 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟,1  to 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠_𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡,𝑟𝑟 . 
For example, the communication may confirm parameters or 
prioritize preferences.  
B. Efficient and Secure Transfer of  
Smart Contracts and Underlying Entities 
Smart contract functionality can be extended further by:  
(i) introducing mechanisms for efficient and secure transfer of 
entities on a blockchain [6][7], and then (ii) using these 
mechanisms in cases where the entities being transferred are 
underlying smart contracts. Notice that a smart contract can 
also be an underlying of another smart contract. For example, 
the ownership of a tokenized financial instrument is 
transferred through a smart contract, and the structure of the 
financial instrument is implemented through another smart 
contract. The underlyings can include physical assets and IoT 
devices manipulated through the contracts, or virtual assets – 
such as rights on physical assets or rights on particular 
services – that are controlled through the contract. The 
increased smart-contract functionality, in turn, helps sustain 
blockchain-enabled services of varying complexity. 
The transfer of entities underlying smart contracts is 
facilitated trough tokenization techniques. Enhanced 
optimization of memory usage in the electronic transfers, and 
improved security and data integrity are achieved through 
hashing techniques. Steps in the transfer mechanism involve: 
 Generating a script 𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 that comprises:  
▫ A set of metadata 𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘  associated with an invitation for 
the exchange of an entity 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 , where 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘  is one of the 
underlyings of a smart 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  or 
𝑪𝑪𝑺𝑺 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆1  … 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝒏𝒏,1 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆1,𝒊𝒊 … 
…
 
…
 
…
 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝒏𝒏,𝒋𝒋 
…
 
CS 𝒏𝒏,𝒋𝒋,1,1
 
… CS 𝒏𝒏,𝒋𝒋,𝒍𝒍,1
 
CS 1,𝒊𝒊,𝒌𝒌,1
 … CS 1,𝒊𝒊,1,1
 
CS 𝒏𝒏,𝒋𝒋,𝒍𝒍,𝒑𝒑
 
CS 1,𝒊𝒊,𝒌𝒌,𝒎𝒎
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𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐. The meta-data includes a pointer or other 
reference to the location of that contract. 
▫ The derived public key 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘  associated with the 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 and used in scripts, transactions and 
communication in relation to the exchange of entity 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 
owned by 𝐷𝐷.  
▫ The derived public key  𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘  of the 
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴  managing the contract issued by 𝐷𝐷 , 
where 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘  is used only in relation to entity 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 . 
(depending on the overall contract’s conditionality 
structure, the agent here can be a 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴, 
as well) 
 Hashing 𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 and publishing 𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 and its hash on a distributed 
hash table (DHT), which is distributed across a (worldwide) 
network and the script hash serves as a DHT look-up key. 
▫ This DHT resource differs from the DHT repository of 
contracts discussed in Section II. 
 Generating an invitation transaction 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘  for inclusion on the 
blockchain, where the transaction comprises the hash of 𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 
and an indication of an entity 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘′  to be transferred in 
exchange for 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘. 
 Scanning through the plurality of DHT entries, where each 
entry comprises:  
▫ an invitation to perform an exchange of an entity 𝐸𝐸𝑢𝑢 
underlying a smart contract; and 
▫ a link to an invitation transaction 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑢𝑢  on the blockchain. 
 (Partial) matching of the set of metadata 𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘 from the initial 
invitation-entry in the DHT repository of invitations, to a set 
of metadata 𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 in another invitation-entry. Each set 𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘 and 
𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 comprises:  
▫ an indication of entities to be exchanged, 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 for 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘′  and 
𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚 for 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚′ , correspondingly, where 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘′ ≈ 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚 and 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚′ ≈
𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘, and 
▫ conditions for the exchange that also (partially) match. 
 Generating, broadcasting, and recording on the blockchain 
of an exchange transaction 𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚 that includes: 
▫ The script 𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 , signed with the derived private key 
𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘  of the 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 , where 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 
corresponds as cryptographic pairing to the public key 
𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 . The script 𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘  may also be signed by the 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴 using the private key 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 . (the 
agent here can be a 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴, as well)  
▫ The script 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚  of the (partially) matching DHT 
invitation-entry, signed with the private key 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚 
corresponding to public key 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚, and signed with 
the private key 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚  corresponding to 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚 . 
These keys are associated, respectively, with the 
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵  and 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵  .  (the agent 
here can be a 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵, as well) 
▫ A first input provided from an output of invitation 
transaction 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘  . 
▫ A second input provided from an output of invitation 
transaction 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚 . 
▫ A first output indicating a quantity of the (tokenized) 
entity 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘  to be transferred to the control of 
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵 , and to the ownership of 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵  . (the smart contract here can be a 
𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐵𝐵, as well) 
▫ A second output indicating a quantity of the (tokenized) 
entity 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚  to be transferred to the control of 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴  and to the ownership of 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴  . (the smart contract here can be a 
𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴, as well) 
In a hypothetical example, pension funds offer a variety of 
structured pension products and clients can hold a portfolio of 
different structured products from different funds. For each of 
the structured pension products a client holds, he may also 
select the proportion of the elements within the product. 
Clients of different funds are allowed to exchange (parts of) 
their holdings under certain conditions. The conditions differ 
among funds in level of detail and restrictive constraints, and 
so the exchange is not standardized. In the context of pensions, 
the actions are of relatively low frequency and based on long 
term perspective. When a client 𝐶𝐶  would like to exchange 
parts of his holdings, he acts as a 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶 . The 
smart contract managing the exchange of all structured 
pension products (𝑃𝑃) he holds is a 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 within a 
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶 managing his financial assets. As a 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶  (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) , the client 𝐶𝐶  has different public/ 
private pairs of cryptographic sub-keys derived from  
his master pair of keys 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆⁄  . One of these  
pairs of sub-keys, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃⁄ , is associated with  
the 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 .  The 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶  and the 
𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶
𝑃𝑃  are managed, correspondingly, by a 
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶  and a 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃 .  The 
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶   has its own pair of master keys 
𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆⁄  and the derived from them pairs of sub-
keys. One of these sub-key pairs, 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶 _𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃� , is 
associated with the client’s pension holdings. The 
𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚_𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶 𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 ) has a pair of cryptographic 
keys 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆⁄  , and uses them for the transactions 
associated with the start and closure of the 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 . 
Following the transfer mechanism described in this Section 
III.B, each one of the pension products held by the client 𝐶𝐶 is 
an entity 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘  underlying the 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶  𝑃𝑃 and this 
subcontract has 𝑐𝑐  underlying entities, 1 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 . The 
exchange of each entity 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘  is further associated with a 
separate pair of cryptographic keys 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘⁄  used 
by 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃  within the same 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 .  These keys are 
derived from 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆⁄  using the algorithm from 
Eqs. (1-10). The generator values in this algorithm are now 
based on information about entries in the (worldwide) DHT 
exchange repository of entities underplaying smart contracts. 
Some of the entities 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘  ,  1 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 , underlying the same 
𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶
𝑃𝑃 , can be exchanged in parallel and others in 
sequence, depending on restrictions by different pension 
funds. Each pair 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶
  
𝑃𝑃_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘  � is used with script 𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘𝑃𝑃 , 
invitation transaction 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘  𝑃𝑃  , and exchange transaction 𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚 𝑃𝑃  , 
for 1 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑐𝑐. For each 𝑡𝑡, a common secret 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘𝑃𝑃 is produced 
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from the cryptographic key-pairs 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃_𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘  � and 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
  _𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘𝑃𝑃 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  _𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘𝑃𝑃� , using the algorithm from Eqs. (11-21). 
The encryption key based on the common secret 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘𝑃𝑃 is used 
to provide a secure channel of communication about the 
corresponding structured pension product 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘. Notice, as well, 
that each 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 a client holds is itself a smart contract managing 
the constitution of a structured financial product, and so the 
entities underlying 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 are smart contracts. These 
contracts 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 are not sub-subcontracts of 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 and 
are not in its conditionality structure. Each contract 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 
implements the logic of the corresponding financial 
instruments. 𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘 is not necessarily a tokenization of an existing 
off-chain instrument but also a creation of a new financial 
instrument that does not exist off-chain.  
The method proposed in this Section III.B provides for 
data integrity and optimization of memory. The DHT 
invitation-entries, initiated at different stages of the 
conditionality structures of a variety of smart contracts, may 
be matched worldwide or within a scope indicated in / 
required by the smart contracts. The method enables disparate 
smart contracts and subcontracts to identify and match each 
other in terms of underlying entities, and to securely exchange 
these underlyings. The method does not require alteration of 
existing blockchain protocols, while embedding metadata in 
scripts associated with blockchain transactions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper introduces methods for extending the 
functionality of blockchain-enforced smart contracts. We 
propose a mechanism for automated management of smart 
contracts with hierarchical conditionality structures, and a 
mechanism for efficient and secure matching and transfer of 
contract underlyings among diverse smart contracts and 
subcontracts. Services, enabled by implementing blockchain-
enforced smart contracts with extended functionality, are 
secure, efficiently automated, and allow (worldwide) resource 
distribution. They present sustainable alternatives and 
complements to some of the current service infrastructures 
within a range of domains., particularly when some of them 
are underperforming or with unreliable security.  
Our research focus is next on big-data analysis of the 
potential effects on the performance of blockchain networks 
and services due to: (i) adopting different innovative methods 
for extending blockchain functionality, (ii) the rate of 
adoption, and (iii) the sequence in which they are adopted. 
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